



THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
THAT a subject of such vital interest as the right to take private
property for public uses, more particularly in the later history of
the law, when the exercise of that right, in the furtherance of com-
mercial enterprise has become of so frequent occurrence, should
have received so small a share of the attention of the members of
the profession, maywell be a matter of some surprise.
While other departments of the law have received laborious com-
ment, and ample illustration, and have been reduced into a regular
and orderly system, facilitating the researches of the student, or
the demands of the practitioner, this has remained scattered over
the whole field of the English and American reports, and is to be
reached only through a long and tedious examination of the several
cases. Important as the subject undoubtedly is, no text book has
as yet appeared upon it, and we begin our investigation without
the advantage the labors of others always confer. We must re-
mind our readers also, that -within our prescribed limits, we have not
the space to do our subject the justice its merits demand. If we
are successful in discovering the leading, elementary principles,
properly belonging to it, and establishing them upon reasonable
foundations, we conceive all has been done our limits will permit.
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The History of the subject of our essay, closely interwoven as it
is with almost every political change among governments, would, of
itself, be sufficient to cover far more than the limits assigned us.
Tyrants have made it the plea of inflicting the most arbitrary mea-
sures in all ages of the world :' from the flagrant iniquity of Jeze-
bel, 2 to the days of our own revolution, when England sent her
minions among us, "To harass our people and eat out their sub-
stance," the earnest desire of mankind has been to secure them-
selves from an abuse of this power. The arbitrary exercise of it
by Great Britain, in derogation of the rights of the citizens of this
country, whereby private property was frequently taken, without
consent and without compensation, drew from the patriots of the
revolution our declaration of rights. It is a historical fact, that
free institutions have generally originated in some arbitrary invasion
of private right on the part of the government which preceded their
.establishment. Magna Charta was extorted from a tyrant, and the
independence of America was the result of imperial oppression, ex-
ercised in hostility to private rights.3 The happy limitations which
have been imposed on this power, both in England and at home, it
will now be our business to consider.
When mankind, convinced that the only means by which their
lives and property could be effectually secured to each other, was
by some accumulation of power that should be able to resist suc-
cessfully the aggressions of individual force,4 chose to form -them-
selves into societies, and communities,5 for the purpose of creating
that power, it was found that to accomplish the purpose of protec-
tion, certain rights and properties which had before subsisted in the
individual man in his natural state, must be transferred to and be-
come a part of the newly created power.6 The subject, then, by
entering into the compact of society, consents to yield to that so-
ciety, so much of his own liberty and right of property, as may be
necessary to consummate the purposes for which he became a party
1 13 Bar. 86; 17 Wend. 302. 2 1 XKings, ch. 21.
32 Denio, 487.
4 1 Blac. Com. 43; Vattel, B. 1, ch. 4, 39.
5 Burlamq. B. 2, ch. 3, 20. 6 1 Blac. Com., 125.
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to the compact.' The power created by this contribution of rights,
is termed the "sovereignty," and has for its object the protection
and preservation to the subject, of these rights not so delegated to
itself. It is the union and exercise of all human power possessed in
a state.2
One of the component parts of this supreme power, is found to
consist in rights granted touching the goods of the subject. He
concedes the right to be directed in the manner of their use, so that
his enjoyment of them may not be detrimental to his fellows ;3 and
also when the exigencies of the State, for its welfare or preserva-
tion, may require it, to yield up the remainder of his interest in a
part or the whole of his property. This constitutes that part of the
supreme power, which Puffendorf terms: "The power of the sove-
reign over the estates of his subjects ;" and is by him divided into
the right to make "sumptuary laws," and the right of "transcend-
ental propriety." 4
With the first of these elements we have nothing to do, we are
directed to a consideration of that part of this power, which pro-
perly comprehends the latter. Vattel has most accurately and com-
prehensively defined it to be "THE RIGHT, WHICH BELONGS TO THE
SOCIETY OR THE SOVEREIGN, OF DISPOSING IN CASE OF NECESSITY,
AND FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY, OF ALL THE WEALTH CONTAINED IN
THE STATE."
5
From this definition, it will be seen that the purpose and scope of
the right of eminent domain, contemplate a benefit to the whole
community, and thus the foundation of the principle, that it cannot
be enjoyed or exercised by the individual.6 It is signified under the
various terms, " Transcendental Propriety," 7 "Right Paramount,"8
and "Sovereign Domain." 9 In the civil law it is known as "Do-
minium Eminens." In the modern English law, however, it is now
universally known under the term Eminent Domain. It is to be
I Vattel, B. 1, ch. 4,' 38. 2 Story Const., 207.
2Puff. B. 8, ch. 5, 3. 4 Puff. B. 8, ch. 5, 7.
6 Vattel, B. 1, ch. 20, 244; :Puff. B. 8, ch. 5, 7; 2 Henec. 166; Burlamq.,
vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 5, 24; Grot. B. 1, ch. 1, 6; 2 Kent, 339; 1 Black. Com. 189;
2 Rutherf. Inst., 456.
6 2 Dall. 810. 7 Puff. B. 8, ch. 5, 7.
s 2 Rutherf. Inst. ch. 9, 6. 9 10 Price, 460.
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distinguished from the Public Domain, or domain of the State ; for
the State as well as individuals may have a right of private property
in certain things, and in regard to them exercises all the rights of
an ordinary proprietor.'
We propose to treat our subject in the following order:
iEminent Domain is a Bight.
Whether a power or an interest.
As affected by the United States Constitution.
Which belongs to the Soczety or the Sovereign.
Where the right rtsts: Here.
In England.
Of Disposing.
By agents ; grants of authority.
Construction.
Compensation ; where required.
How ascertained, &c.
Where none required
In case of Necessity and for the Public safety.
Necessities; Ordinary.
Extraordinary.
Of all the wealth contained in the State.
Property generally.
First, then it is a RIGHT.
The signification of the word, by which this part of our defini-
tion of eminent domain is described, will assist us materially in
coming to an accurate understanding of the attribute itself. "By
a right," says Rutherforth,2 we commonly mean that quality in a
person, which makes it just or right for him either to possess cer-
tain things, or to do certain actions. This being the legal import of
the word right, we conclude that it bears in its signification either
the idea of a power, or only an interest. The books use rather in-
definite terms, sometimes speaking of it indifferently as one or the
,other, and perhaps for practical purposes it is immaterial in which
Light it is viewed, but from a consideration of the naturd of the right-
1 19 Amer. Jur. 121-2; Proudham. Traite du Domain, &c.
2 Rutherf. Inst. B. 1, ch. 1, 3.
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itself, and the purpose of its exercise, we have come to the conclu-
sion, that it partakes more of the nature of an interest in the pro-
perty itself, than of a mere power to control its destination.' Again
we prefer the words of the accurate and sententious Rutherforth.
"A nation by settling upon one tract of land, which, at the time of
luch settlement had no other owner, acquires in respect of all other
nations, an exclusive right of full or absolute property. This abso-
lute property of a ,iation, in what it has thus seized upon, is its right
of territory. When I say that a nation's right of territory consists
in the absolute ownership of the land where it has settled, I mean its
right of territory as far as other nations, or the members of other na-
tions, are affected by this right. For in respect of its own members, its
right of territory consists, not in an absolute, but in a paramount pro-
perty. Occupancy in the gross gave the nation from the first a right
of absolute property in the land where it settled. But a subsequent
distribution and assignment, or a subsequent occupancy in parcels,
gives the several members of the nation, private property in their re-
spective shares. This private property, which they acquire by the
assignment of the public, or by their own particular occupancy with
the leave of the public, though it implies a right to use what is thus
acquired, and to dispose of it, is not strictly a right of full property
or absolute ownership. It is property because it is an exclusive
right, in respect to all other individuals, to use the land and to dis-
pose of it. But it is not full or absolute property in the strictest
sense, because the public has a right to limit, and direct the use and
disposal in such manner as the common safety and welfare require.
This right of the nation is a sort of property, it is an exclusive right
in respect of all other persons whatsoever,2 whether individual or
collective, to direct the use, and the disposal, of the land, for the
purposes of social union." 3 As we before remarked, our own courts
in using the term "right" of eminent domain, speak rather of its
effects, than of the quality itself, yet where their attention has
seemed to be directed to the latter, they have pronounced it in some
cases, the highest and most exact idea of property,4 and dominium,
115 Vt. 751. 2 Wheat. Int. Law, 217. 3 Ruthf. Inst. B. 2, ch. 9, 6.
4 Grot. B. 1, ch. 1, 6. 3 Paige, 73; contra 1 Hill, R. P. 82.
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from whence the phrase comes, bears in its legal sense property and
not power."
From the fact that the right of eminent domain is one of the
elements of government-an essential to its existence, 2 comes the
force of the proposition, that it exists above and superior to all
constitutions.3 It is one of the fundamental principles upon which
governments find their foundations; without it, any system would
be imperfect, and necessarily inoperative. The State could not
subsist, or constantly administer the public affairs in the most
advantageous manner, if it had not a power to dispose occasionally
of all kinds of property subject to its authority ;4 it is therefore said
to be inherent in the sovereign: it attaches to his very existence;
and when laws mention it, it is not so much in declaration of its
principles, as in restraint of its possible abuses. Hence, will be
seen the force of the assertion, that to part with it is to commit a
species of national suicide.' The question as to how far a people
might divest themselves of this sovereign attribute could not arise
in England, or at least has not as yet, so far as we know: and the
reason why it can never arise in that country finds its solution in the
form of government peculiar to those States, which have never
enjoyed the benefits of a constitution such as our own. The King
and Parliament of Great Britain are the supreme authority of the
State,6 and as such would be bound by no transfer of this attribute
of sovereignty, even assuming the State could subsist without it.
We are safe then, we think, in asserting the impossibility of such a
question ever coming before an English court.
In this country, however, the question has arisen, and been
elaborately examined; and upon some subjects, after years of
litigation, has been put at rest forever. 7 But there is still a class
of cases that remain to vex our halls of justice with their perplexing
subtleties, and leave unsymmetrical the structure of American
jurisprudence." It grew out of the peculiarity of our national
institutions and form of government.
12 Pars. Con. 519. 2 4 Pet. S. C. 561.
3 4 Pet. S. C. 548. 4 Vattel B. 1 244.
r 6 Cranch, 143; Puff. B. 8, ch. 5, 7. 6 4 Inst. 86; 1 Blac. Com. 91.
7 21 Vt. 594 &c.; 6 How. 529. 8 2 Pars. Con. 523.
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Upon the separation of the colonies from Great Britain, each one
of them became a separate, independent sovereignty. For the
purpose of successfully resisting the English government, a con-
federacy was formed; and upon the conclusion of the war, from a
common sympathy and late experience of its mutual benefits, the
confederacy, with a brief interval,' was more intimately connected
and strengthened by the formation of the Constitution of the United
States. By the provisions of this instrument, the people in their
sovereign capacity entered into a solemn compact with each other,'
to administer the functions of their government in a specified
manner; and created the several departments of the government,
constituting them their agents to accomplish its provisions. This
constitution is the supreme law of the land, to which every other
power is subordinate. It will thus be seen that a part of the
sovereign powers of each State was conceded to the confederacy;
and to the extent of the powers conceded, to that extent were these
powers extinguished in each of the several States.3  A part of the
constitution contains certain specific inhibitions or limitations on
the power of the States, which the exigencies of the times, and
policy of the government, demanded. Among these was the clause
relative to contracts.
Owing to the rupture with the mother country, and the necessary
consequences following thereon, great pecuniary embarrassment
was experienced throughout the colonies, and in almost all of them,
laws were passed relative to tender and extension of time; all of
which seemed to increase rather than diminish the evil; it had
proceeded to that extent, that, in the words of the Fede-
ralist- "The sober people of America had become weary of the
fluctuating policy which had directed the public councils ;,,4 and in
view of a prevention of it for the future, they deemed it expedient
to insert the 10th section of the first article of the Constitution of
the United States,.which declares that "No State shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts."
Perhaps there is no clause of the constitution which has given
I 1 Story Corn. Con. 243-71. 2 1 Story Com. Con. 310. 3 7 Con. 247.
4 Federalist, No. 44; Story Const. 1,368; Tuck. Blac. vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 312.
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rise to more acute and vehement controversy than this; and the
extent of whose prohibitory force has called forth more animated
juridicial discussion, a very large share of which has involved the
question-to a proper understanding of which we have deemed this
cursory glance at the leading peculiarities of our government neces-
sary-of how far a State, under the constitution, shall be held to
have divested itself of the right of eminent domain. The discussion
originated in that singular class of contracts termed franchises,
which involve in their nature the evident liabilities of property to
the public uses; together with the compliated question of the
constitutional protection afforded to a contract.
There is perhaps no part of the law of eminent domain which has
received so large a share of the consideration of the courts, or which
has been more difficult to establish on unquestionable principles,
than that part of it pertaining to incorporeal property. In our own
country, it is believed that the exercise of this power was never, or
at any rate rarely, questioned, until the opinion seems to have
obtained that the right of property in a chartered corporation was
more sacred and intangible than the same right could possibly be
in the person of the citizen; an opinion which must be without any
grounds to rest upon, until it can be demonstrated either that the
ideal creature is more than a person, or the corporeal being less.1
While it has never been doubted that the ordinary species of pro-
perty are subjected to this right, there seems to have beeh some-
thing in the peculiar nature of this, so abstracted from all other
kinds upon which tha law had heretofore operated, that for a long
time it was doubted, and because of the very diverse views enter-
tained by the courts, for a much longer time contended, there was
an exemption in its favor from the otherwise universal burthen.
The controversy may be said to have originated in the celebrated
Dartmouth College case ;2 in which it was decided that a charter
granted to that institution by George III., was a contract within
the meaning of the clause of the Constitution, that its terms were
inviolable, and that the Legislature of New Hampshire could in no
' 6 How. 533. 23 Ohio, 583.
THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
way annul that contract, or in any way impair its obligation.' This
being a franchise, it was next claimed that as the grant- of a fran-
chise was a contract between the State and the grantee, it could not
rightfully be taken away, diminished or impaired without his con-
sent, even for public purposes. The question arose in New Hamp-
shire. The facts of the case were, briefly, these : The Legislature
of that State made a grant of the privilege of erecting a bridge
within expressed exclusive limits, to the Piscataqua Bridge Com-
pany. At a subsequent period, they deemed the public conveni-
ence required a second bridge, and the New Hampshire Bridge
Company was chartered with the privilege of erecting a bridge
within the exclusive territory. The question was one of singular
importance from the valuable interests it would affect, if decided
either way. The courts had held that a franchise was a contract,
and the constitution declared a contract should not be impaired.
Was it true, then, that the State had never under this clause irre-
vocably parted with their right of eminent domain, and that property,
created by this species of contract, should be privileged from the
otherwise common charge ? Mi. Justice Parker discussed this novel
question in an opinion, the sound law of which is an exposition of
the constitution the courts of the United States have repeatedly
confirmed. He stated in most terse and logically conceived propo-
sitions, drawn from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that the grant under which the first bridge company received
their charter, was undeniably a contract; and that that contract
was inviolable within the constitution; but that it did not impair
that contract to hold that the property acquired under it, may be
taken for public use-that it was liable to be subjected to the pub-
lic servitude and the public burthens.2  This case was not carried
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The next case that occurred involving the question, was one which
it would seem exhausted the learning of the ablest lawyers of the
day; it is almost unnecessary to mention the name of the Charles
River and Warren Bridge case.' The legislature of Massachusetts
extinguishing a ferry privilege over the Charles river, which had
14 Wheat., 518. - 7 N. H., 68 & 0. C. 3 11 Peters S. C., 42-0.
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previously belonged to Harvard College, granted to the Charles River
Bridge Company, the privilege of erecting a bridge over the river
where the ferry had been. No exclusive limits were expressed as
in the New Hampshire case. The legislature afterwards incorpor-
ated the Warren Bridge Company, and authorized them to erect a
bridge so near that of the Charles River Bridge Company, that it
effectually destroyed their tolls. Upon suit, the Charles River
lBridge Company claimed that their charter contained exclusive
limits by implication, which entitled them to compensation, even if
the State had the power to seize their franchise : but that the fran-
chise itself was an implied engagement on the part of the legisla-
ture, not by a subsequent grant of any conflicting charter to inter-
fere with the privilege conferred on them, and, as a contract, was
protected by the constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court of the
State was divided: two of the judges holding that the charter im-
plied no exclusive limits; and, consequently, the legislature inter-
fered with no rights or property belonging to the Charles River
Bridge Company by the grant to the second company; while the
other two members of the court held that there were necessarily
implied exclusive limits, and also an engagement not to charter a
second company which was protected by the constitutional clause.1
On a judgment pro forma the case went to the United States
Supreme Court, wherefour of the seven judges held that the charter,
upon construction, contained no exclusive limits, and, consequently,
the legislature might charter a second company without compensa-
tion. McLean, J. was of the opinion that the charter contained
implied exclusive limits ; but as the second grant operated to take
away the property of the Charles River Bridge Company-" to
operate," as he expressed it, "1 on the subject matter of the contract,
and not on the contract itself," it did not impair the obligation of
it, within the constitutional meaning; and if compensation had been
provided, the grant would have been valid. Story and Thompson,
JJ., held that the charter did, by implication, contain exclusive
limits, which prohibited the legislature from making the second
grant, unless compensation was provided for the injury done the
1 7 Pick., 344-8.
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property vested by the first; but they allowed that if compensation
had been provided, the grant would have been valid.'
The results of the very diverse views, particularly on the con-
struction of the charter claiming privilege by implication, left the
exact light in which the law viewed this kind of property, as affected
by the constitution, a matter of grave doubt; and some of the ablest
constitutional lawyers of the day did not hesitate to declare their
opinion that the decision of the court could not stand.
2
The next case that involved the question of the State's paramount
right, also occurred in Massachusetts. The legislature chartered
the Boston Water Power Company with the privilege of construct-
ing certain dams and basins for milling purposes. By a subsequent
act, the legislature incorporated the Boston and Worcester Railroad
Company, with authority to select the most eligible route between
the two termini; and, upon compensation to whomsoever should be
injured by the construction of such road, to complete the same
between the two cities. The Water Power Company claimed, that
by the performance on their part, of the conditions of their charter,
in the construction of works of great magnitude, expense, and public
utility, they became entitled to the exclusive privilege of forever
occupying the soil included within the limits of their two basins ;
and that the railroad company had no right to construct their road
across these basins, in any manner to the injury or impairment of
their water power, or of the privilege or franchises held by them;
because the legislature could not constitutionally destroy, or essen-
tially injure, by a subsequent grant, a franchise which it had pre-
viously created, and thus in effect vacate its own contract, and this
whether there was provision for compensation or not. The court,
in its decision, adhered to the admirable principle attributed to
Lord Tenterden, of never laying down a larger proposition of law
than the case in hand required.3 They held that the effect of the
authority granted to the railroad company to lay their road over
the basins, was to some extent to diminish their surface and reduce
their value ; but it could in no proper legal sense be considered as
annulling or destroying their franchise, for both could stand together-
2 Webster's Arg., 37 Law Tr. 331 E. C. L., 96.1 11 Peters S. C., 420.
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that the legislature had power, to a limited extent, to exercise the right
of eminent domain over the lands of the Water Power Company,
paying compensation; and as provision was made for it the act was
valid. There was a dictum seeming to approve the law as held in
New Hampshire, but the cases were dissimilar in their facts, and
that case was not cited by the court.'
The next case was again in New Hampshire, and again C. J.
Parker decided that a franchise could pretend to no constitutional
exemption on the ground of its similitude to a contract. A public
road under a general highway act, providing compensation, was
laid out over the road of a turnpike company. The charter of the
company did not, as in the first case, contain any grant of exclu-
sive limits. It was held, in conformity with the previously declared
law of the State, that the highway act did not impair the obliga-
tion of a contract, in taking any property of the turnpike corpora-
tion for public use ; because there was by the terms of the charter,
no contract of that character expressed, and it was not to be
implied.'
The question was next passed upon in the State of Vermont, and
the court there considering the question as having of late been so
fully discussed, both in the State and national tribunals, say that
little more remained for their determination, unless they were pre-
pared to disregard the aid and authority of the numerous decisions
which so commended themselves to the learning of the profession,
and the good sense of the public generally. 3 But neither the good
sense of the public, nor particularly the learning of the profession
of that State, seemed ready to acknowledge the court's conclu-
sions; and accordingly, : case was brought into the same court,
under the same statute, so similar in its facts that the court con-
sidered the attempt to distinguish the two in principle, "altogether
a failure."4 Upon judgment, as in the preceding case, it went on
error to the U. S. Supreme Court.
It is to be observed that the question presented in this case
involved no necessity of construction, as in that of the Charles
River corporation. Here the charter by express provision, granted
7 23 Pick. 360. 2 11 N. H. 19. 3 15 Vermont 745. 4 16 Vt. 446.
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to the West River Bridge Company the exclusive privilege of
erecting and continuing a bridge over West river, and taking tolls
for passing thereon. By the Act of 1839, "in relation to high-
ways," it was declared that the Supreme Court, together with the
county court, should have power to take any franchise of any cor-
poration, upon compensation, when they deemed it necessary to the
public convenience. The franchise of the West River Bridge
Company was taken in conformity with the act, in the manner pre-
scribed. The United States Supreme Court held that the charter
of the West River Bridge Company formed a contract between that
company and the State, which the latter could not impair; but that
this did not exempt the charter from the universal right of eminent
domain-that the Constitution of the United States could by no
rational interpretation be brought to conflict with this attribute of
the States-that the investment of property in the citizen by the
government, when made for a pecuniary consideration, or founded
on conditions of civil or political duty, is a contract with the State
or the government acting as its agent, and the grantee; and both
the parties are bound-in good faith to fulfill it. But that into all
contracts, whether made between States and individuals, or between
individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the
literal terms of the contract itself: they are superinduced by the
pre-existing and higher authority of the law of nature, of nations,
or of the community to which the parties belong: they are always
presumed, and must be presumed to be known and recognized by
all; are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into
express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every
contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their
control, as conditions inherent and paramount whenever a necessity
for their exertion shall occur. Such a condition is the right of
eminent domain. The right does not operate to impair the contract
affected by it, but recognizes its obligation to the fullest extent,
claiming .only the fulfillment of an essential condition. Thus in
claiming the resumption or qualification of the investiture, it insists
merely on the true nature and character of the right invested.'
1 6 How. 532.
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We have thus in our journey down "the current of authorities,"
reached a point from which, whenever the courts touch upon the
question, they consider it so well settled that franchises can claim
no exemption from the right of eminent domain, that it would be
idle to controvert it; indeed whenever the question has been latterly
raised, it has been rather incidental than otherwise, and in every
case to receive cumulative confirmation.1
Another shape in which the question has been most perplexingly
presented, is in the form of express or implied stipulations on the
part of the State through the so-claimed authorized acts of their
legislatures, not to exert their sovereign right of eminent domain.
If the legislatures of the several States have the authority to make
such stipulations, they are certainly under the clause of the consti-
tution, protected from any action of those bodies which would
impair their provisions. Our legislatures are our delegated agents,
and possess the authority to represent the States in all contracts or
engagements they may rightfully make : they are the direct visible
representatives of the will of the people in every act they may
legitimately perform.
The standard by which we must determine whether they have
transcended the limits of that authority, is to be found in this ques-
tion in the nature of the subject matter on which it is claimed they
may act. But this we think will be best presented in as brief an
examination of the cases as the nature of the subject will admit.
In some of the States, for purposes in the highest degree praise-
worthy and commendable in themselves, it has been attempted as an
encouragement to learning, religion, and sometimes questionable
investments in point of profit, to relieve certain institutions or asso-
ciations from liability to contribute in common with all other
property, to the support of the commonwealth.
In the year 1758, the Legislature of the State of New Jersey
passed an act to give effect to an agreement between the State and
a remnant of the tribe of the Delaware Indians. This act, among
other provisions, authorized the purchase of lands for the Indians,
1 21 Vermont, 690; 17 Con. 454; 8 N. H. 398; 9 Geo. 359-517; 13 How. 71;
2 Par. Con. 522.
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and enacted that the land to be purchased for the Indians, afore-
said, shall not hereafter be subject to any tax, any law, usage or
custom to the contrary thereof, in any wise notwithstanding. In
virtue of this act, the agreement with the Indians was executed.
In October, 1804, the legislature passed an act repealing that
section of the act of 1758, which exempted the lands therein men-
tioned from taxation. On a writ of error, the Supreme Court de-
cided that the provision of the Constitution that no State shall pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts, which extended to
contracts to which a State was a party, as well as to contracts
between individuals, was violated by the act of 1804, as the privi-
lege, though for the benefit of the Indians, was annexed by the
terms which create it, to the land itself, and not to their persons.'
In the case of the Providence Bank vs. Billings,2 the Legisla-
ture of Rhode Island had granted a charter of incorporation to
certain individuals, who had associated for the purpose of banking.
They were incorporated with the ordinary powers of such associa-
tions. In 1822 the legislature passed an act imposing a tax on
every bank in the State, except the Bank of the 'United States.
The Providence Bank refused the payment of the tax, alleging that
the act which imposed it, was repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States, as impairing the obligation of the contract created
hy the charter granted to the bank. There was no express contract
in the charter, exempting the bank from taxation; but it was
claimed on behalf of the bank, that such contract must be implied,
because the power to tax may be so wielded as to defeat the purpose
for which the charter was granted.
The court say that the taxing power is of vital importance; that
it is essential to the existence of government, are truths that it
cannot be necessary to affirm. They are acknowledged and asserted
by all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is
never to be assumed. They will not say a State may not relinquish
it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial re-
lease of it may not exist; but as the whole community is interested
in sustaining it undiminished, that the community has a right to
1 7 Craneb, 164. 14 Peters S. C. 514.
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insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed, in a case
in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does
appear; and if the exemption is not found in the language of the
instrument, it would be going very far to insert it by construction.
The power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates
on all the persons and property belonging to the body politic. This
is an original principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It
is granted by all, for the benefit of all. It resides in government as part
of itself, and need not be reserved when property of any description,
or the right to use it in any manner, is granted to individuals or
corporate bodies. However absolute the right of an individual may
be, it is still in the nature of that right that it must bear a portion
of the public burthens, and that portion must be determined by the
legislature. This vital power may be abused; but the Constitution
of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for
every abuse of power which may be committed by the State govern-
ments. The interest, wisdom and justice of the representative
body, and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only secu-
rity, where there is no express contract against unjust and excessive
taxation, as well as against unwise legislation generally.
In Osborne vs. Humphrey,' a statute of the State of Connecticut,
passed in 1702, provided that all such lands as formerly have
been, or hereafter shall be given, either by the general assem-
bly or any town, village, or particular person, for the maintenance
of the gospel, or school of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or
for any other public and charitable use, &c., shall be exempted out
of the general list of estates, and free from the payment of taxes.
The court held that this provision was repealed at the revision of
the statutes in 1821; but relying on the decision in NArew Jersey vs.
Wilson, they were of opinion that the repeal was inoperative as to
the rights already acquired by virtue of the act, being repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, inasmuch as it impaired
the obligation of a contract, and that the land continued to be
exempt from taxation.
In the case of Jardy vs. Inhabitants of Waltham,2 lands, tene-
1 7 Conn. 336. 27 Pick. 108.
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ments, &c., which had been granted to Harvard College, under their
original charter of 1650, in connection with other acts, were ordered
to be from thenceforth and forever exempt from all civil rates,
imposts and taxes. This grant of exemption was expressly con-
firmed by a clause of the State Constitution; consequently, the
legislature could not impose a tax contrary to its provisions.'
In the matter of TMe Mayor, fc., of New York,' it was claimed
that an act declaring "that no real estate belonging to any church
or place of public worship, shall be taxed by any law of the State,"
exempted the property specified from assessments for the benefit of
the town, county, or State at large, but not from a special assess-
ment for a benefit in which the property would directly participate.
The question of legislative ability to release the subject from taxes,
by a constitutionally supported contract, is not considered.
The next case arose in New Hampshire. 3  The legislature of
that State, in 1780, by an act or joint resolution, exempted the
land appropriated to the use of Dartmouth College, from payment
of taxes. In 1885, the proper authorities assessed taxes on a
certain tract of land belonging to the college. The question of
exemption was discussed by Parker, C. J., who said, "The power of
taxation is essentially a power of sovereignty or eminent domain,
and it may well deserve consideration whether this power is not
inherent in the people, in a republican form of government, and so
far inalienable that no legislature can make a contract by which
it shall be surrendered, without express authority for that purpose
in the constitution, or in some way directly from the people them-
selves." Referring to the case of New Jersey vs. W"lson,4 he said,
"To that decision, based as it is upon a subject particularly within
the cognizance and jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court, we yield all deference, and should feel 'bound to follow it in
a like case, could one come before us, until the tribunal which made
the decision should overrule it. Perhaps it may well be supported
on the ground that the act was in the nature of a treaty with the
Indians, which the legislature of New Jersey might in 1758 well
1 10 N. 11. 145.
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make with a body of them residing within the borders of the State,
but constituting a separate and distinct people, governed by their
own laws. The general rights of a legislature to surrender the
power of taxing a portion of the property within the State, by a
contract with some of its own citizens, in such a manner as to
deprive a future legislature of the right to subject such property to
its proportion of the public burthens, and this without an express
grant of power in the constitution, does not appear to have been
considered in that case. Let it be distinctly understood, that we do
not intend to suggest a doubt of the right of the legislature in
divers instances to make contracts which shall bind future legisla-
tures, but to hold that the legislature cannot make a grant whereby
property shall be exempted from public use; and to hold also, that
they cannot contract to exonerate the property of the citizens from
taxation, and thereby bind future legislatures, by no means indicates
an opinion that the legislature have a right to rescind or abrogate
grants of land and franchises or.contracts lawfully entered into by
a preceding legislature. But there is a material difference between
the right of a legislature to grant lands or corporate powers or
money, and a right to grant away the essential attributes of sove-
reignty or right of eminent domain. These do not seem to furnish
the subject matter of a contract." But on the principle that the
relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed,' as there
was no express grant of exemption, the court do not find it neces-
sary to settle how far one legislature may bind another, in relation
to the power of taxation.
The next case originated in Maryland.2  The legislature of that
State, in 1821, extended the charter of several banks to 1845, upon
condition that they would construct a certain road and pay a school
tax; and further provided, that upon any of the aforesaid banks
complying with the terms and conditions of the act, the faith of
the State was pledged not to impose any further tax or burthen
upon them during the continuance of their charters, under that act.
In 1841, an act was passed for the general valuation and assessment
e 3 How. 188.IAnte, -655.
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of property, under which taxes were laid upon the bank-the plaintiff
in error in the case before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The question raised by the agreed statement of facts was, "Did
the act of Maryland of 1841, so far as it imposes a tax upon the
shares of stock held by the stockholders in these banks claiming
the benefit of the exemption, impair the obligation of a contract ?"
The court do not pass upon the above question, but say, " The
question which this court is called upon to decide, and to which our
decision will be confined is, Are the shareholders in the old and new
banks liable to be taxed on their stocks, under the act of 1841?
The argument for the State admitted the validity of the exemption,
as to the franchise itself, but contended that the exemption did not
extend to the shares of the stockholders. Upon construction of the
act of exemption, the court find "that the clause in question was
not meant as a pledge against further taxation upon the franchise
alone, but that it was a pledge against additionaZ taxation; and
then proceeding to examine whether the exemption, by the terms of
the charter, extended to the capital stock of the banks as an aggre-
gate, and the stockholders from being taxed as persons on account
of their stock, decide that it extends to both." This being a case
of construction, decides nothing towards the validity of a stipula-
tion of this nature.
The question has been raised in Ohio, and in a late case the court,
reiterating the law as previously declared, held with emphasis that
the legislature could, under no combination of circumstances, relin-
quish the power of the State to tax its citizens for the support of
the government.'
We have now gone through the cases involving this question, and
we see that the law is by no means certainly settled; but from the
whole number of cases, we should say that it is our opinion, that when
the question is by the Supreme Court of the United States disposed
of, it will be against the view that a State by her legislature may
part absolutely with her power of taxation 2
There is another class of cases analogous to those claiming
1 1 Ohio S. R. 578. 22 Par. Con. 525.
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exemption from taxation, which, if anything, places the question in
a stronger light.
It is where the State by express terms, in granting a particular
property, stipulates not to exert her right of eminent domain, as to
that property or the subject-matter of that grant. This question
arose in Connecticut.1 The legislature of that State, in 1798,
chartered the Enfield Toll Bridge Company, with the privilege of
erecting and maintaining a bridge over the Connecticut river, for
the term of one hundred years. The charter further provided that
no person should have liberty to erect another bridge between the
north line of Enfield and the south line of Windsor. The com-
pany accepted the charter and constructed the bridge. Afterwards
the Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, under a charter
granted to them to construct a road between the two cities of those
names, built a bridge within the exclusive limits. The charter of
the railroad company contained a clause that nothing therein con-
tained should prejudice the rights of the Enfield Toll Bridge Com-
pany.
It was holden by the court, that it was the intention of those who
framed the latter charter, that the rights of all should be secured
and equally secured, which was in terms effected by the stipulation
of exclusive limits; and to the argument that by thus seizing the
franchise, the State was impairing the obligation of its own con-
tract, the court replied: 1 This is to assume that there is no im-
plied reservation in any contract with the State of the right of
eminent domain."
A similar case occurred lately in Massachusetts. 2 The Boston
and Lowell Railroad Company was incorporated in 1830, with the
privilege of constructing a road between Boston and Lowell. The
twelfth section of the act stipulated "that no other railroad shall,
within thirty years, be authorized to be made from Boston to Cam-
bridge, or Charlestown to Lowell, or to any place within five miles
f the northern terminus of the Boston and Lowell road," with a
reservation to the State of the privilege of purchasing the road upon
2 2 Gray's, (not yet published.)1 17 Conn. 61.
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payment of the whole cost of the road, with ten per cent. interest
up to the time of purchase. Afterwards the Salem and Lowell,
the Boston and Maine, and the Lowell and Lawrence Railroad
Companies, were successively chartered, and by their junction and
intersection there was a direct railroad route from Boston to
Lowell. An injunction was prayed for to restrain them from so
connecting.
Chief Justice Shaw, with the same caution which characterized
him in the decision of an analogous case,' held that the State might
well grant that such privilege should be exclusive, in consideration
of the benefits conferred upon the public by the use of private capi-
tal and enterprise, reserving to itself the right to resume, in a spe-
cified manner, such franchise wfen the public necessities should
demand it; and that a grant of this nature was not a surrender of
the right of eminent domain, but that it still existed to be exercised
in a particular way. Also, that the State had not,.by the subsequent
grant to the railroad companies, intended any injury to its. previous
grant to the first company; and that, as the connection of the roads
did injury to the Boston and Lowell Railroad, they should be re-
strained from su(-h ennnection. It will be perceived that the ques-
tion, if at all, is only incidentally raised; it having been allowed
that the State had not relinquished her right of eminent domain,
but only prescribed the special mode in which it should be exerted.
And this concludes our observations on the right of eminent
domain, as affected by the constitutional clause inhibiting the im-
pairing or infringing'of the obligation of contracts.
I Ante, p. 651.
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